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Abstract 
The analysis of migration in Findlay (1982) is extended by adding external economies of 
scale to the Ricardian model as in Ethier (1982). With external economies, the larger country 
always gains from trade but the smaller country may lose from trade unless the external 
economies of scale are sufficiently strong. The smaller country will always gain from 
emigration but the larger country may lose from immigration unless the external economies 
of scale are sufficiently strong. Both countries gain from complete economic integration (free 
labour migration with free trade). Finally, the optimal migration policies of the two countries 
are derived. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the formation of the GATT in 1947 there has been substantial progress on the 
liberalisation of international trade but over this time, there has not been a corresponding 
liberalisation of international labour migration. The existence of substantial wage differences 
between countries shows that there are very large potential gains from the liberalisation of 
labour migration.1 This has lead to suggestions that there should be multilateral negotiations 
about labour migration and possibly a WTO for international migration. Hatton (2007) argues 
that because trade is driven by comparative advantage whereas labour migration is driven by 
absolute advantage then there is no basis for WTO-style multilateral negotiations. This paper 
presents a two-country model with external economies of scale where the full benefits of 
economic integration can only be achieved by free trade and free labour migration, but one 
country may lose from free trade and the other country may lose from free labour migration. 
However, by linking the issues of trade and migration in multilateral negotiations, it is 
possible to achieve the full benefits of economic integration. 
The simplest analysis of the effects of labour migration used in many textbooks is 
based upon what Ruffin (1984) calls the MacDougall-Kemp model. There are two factors 
(capital and labour) and there is one good that is produced using constant returns to scale 
technology under perfect competition. Since there is only one good there will be no trade in 
the absence of factor mobility. Labour migration from the labour-abundant country to the 
capital-abundant country will reduce the wage and increase the return to capital in the capital-
abundant country. The overall effect will be positive for the native residents in the capital-
abundant country due to what Borjas (1995) calls the immigration surplus and Freeman 
(2006) calls the native gain. Overall the original residents of the labour-abundant country will 
gain from emigration. The migrant workers obviously gain as they receive higher wages, but 
                                                 
1 Freeman (2006) argues that the worldwide variation in wages is much larger than variation in the 
prices of goods or the variation in the cost of capital. 
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the residents that remain in the labour-abundant country will lose unless they receive 
remittances from the migrants sufficient to offset their losses. Free labour migration results in 
a Pareto efficient allocation of capital and labour in the world. 
A general analysis of factor mobility under perfect competition was undertaken by 
Grossman (1984), who assumed that factor payments were remitted to the source country.2 
He showed that although the equilibrium with free trade and free factor mobility is superior 
to the autarky equilibrium, a move from the free trade and no factor mobility equilibrium to 
the free trade and free factor mobility equilibrium would not always yield a welfare gain for 
the country. This results from the terms of trade effect of introducing free factor mobility 
starting from an initial equilibrium with free trade. If the terms of trade effect is negative then 
it may outweigh any allocative efficiencies from free factor mobility. Obviously, the terms of 
trade effect does not occur in the MacDougall-Kemp model as there is no trade in the absence 
of factor mobility. 
In the Ricardian model, Findlay (1982) showed that the residents of the host country 
will lose as a result of a move from the free trade equilibrium to the free trade and free labour 
migration equilibrium due to the negative terms of trade effect from immigration.3 
Immigration in the Ricardian model does not provide any allocative or productivity gain for 
the host country since the productivity of its native workers is unchanged, but there is a 
productivity gain for the migrant workers whose productivity increases to be the same as that 
in the host country. However, there is a negative terms of trade effect for the native residents 
in the host country as the migrants are employed in the export industry that expands thereby 
reducing the price of its exports.4 The residents that remain in the source country will gain 
                                                 
2 The focus of the Grossman (1984) was not the migration of labour and the model had one consumer 
in each country. 
3 One should note that Findlay (1982) was using distributive justice to argue the case for free migration. 
4 This is similar to the negative terms of trade effect that causes immiserizing growth in Bhagwati 
(1958). 
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from a positive terms of trade effects as the export industry in the source country contracts 
thereby increasing the price of its exports. Both countries are better of in the free trade and 
free migration equilibrium, which is Pareto efficient, than in the autarky equilibrium. 
Recently, Davis and Weinstein (2002) have used the Findlay (1982) analysis as the basis for 
their estimates of the terms of trade loss from immigration for the USA and they claimed that 
the terms of trade loss amounted to $72billion or 0.8% of GDP for the USA. 
This paper extends the analysis of Findlay (1982) by adding external economies of 
scale to the Ricardian model as in Ethier (1982). The implications of external economies of 
scale for the size of the immigration surplus were discussed by Borjas (1995), and Trefler 
(1998) presents a numerical example based upon the simple model in Helpman (1984). The 
main concern of Ethier (1982) was the pattern of trade and the welfare effects of free trade. 
He showed that the larger country will specialise in the production of the good with external 
economies of scale and will always gain from trade but, as suggested by Graham (1923), the 
smaller country may lose from trade if the larger country completely specialises in the 
production of the good with external economies of scale.5 This paper will extend the analysis 
of the gains from free trade in Ethier (1982) by deriving the critical value for the degree of 
external economies of scale required for gains from trade in the smaller country. However, 
the main contribution of this paper will be to analyse the welfare effects of free migration in 
the Ethier (1982) model when the larger country completely specialises in the production of 
the good with external economies of scale. It will be shown that the smaller (source) country 
will always gain from emigration while the larger (host) country may lose from immigration. 
The critical value for the degree of external economies of scale required for gains from 
migration in the larger country will be derived. It will be shown that both countries gain from 
complete economic integration (free trade and free migration). However, since the smaller 
                                                 
5 The Graham argument and the debate that ensued are discussed in detail by Irwin (1996, chapter 
nine). 
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country may lose from trade and the larger country may lose from migration, sequential 
liberalisation of international trade then labour migration may not yield the full gains from 
economic integration. This suggests that the issues of trade and migration should be linked in 
multilateral negotiations in order to achieve the full benefits of economic integration. Finally, 
the optimal migration policies of the two countries will be considered, where the host country 
maximises the welfare of its native residents and the source country maximises the welfare of 
its remaining residents. For the host country, it will be shown that the no immigration is 
optimal when the degree of external economies of scale is low and that unrestricted 
immigration is optimal when the degree of external economies of scale is high. For 
intermediate values of the degree of external economies of scale, restricted immigration is 
optimal. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is basically the same as that used by Ethier (1982). There are two almost 
identical countries (labelled A and B) with AL  ( BL ) workers each endowed with one unit of 
labour in country A (B). The larger country is labelled as country A so it has more or the same 
number of workers as the smaller country labelled as country B, A BL L≥ , and the relative 
labour endowment is defined as the ratio A BL Lλ ≡ , which is greater than or equal to one, 
1λ ≥ . The technology available in the two countries is assumed to be identical. The labour 
can be used to produce two goods that are labelled X and Y. It is perfectly mobile between 
these two industries, but initially it is assumed to be internationally immobile. There are 
external economies of scale in the production of good X that are national in scope whereas 
there are constant returns to scale in the production of good Y. Although there are economies 
of scale, there is perfect competition in both industries, and in the labour market. Thus, firms 
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producing good X are small relative to the size of the industry and take the size of the X 
industry as given. The labour input requirement to produce one unit of good X in country A is 
X Aa X
θ−= , which is decreasing in the output of the X industry in country A and where 
( )0,1θ ∈  is a measure of the degree of external economies of scale. Similarly, since 
technology is identical, the labour input requirement in country B is X Bb X
θ−= . The marginal 
product of labour in country A is 1 X Aa X
θ=  and country B is 1 X Bb X θ=  so the marginal 
product of labour is increasing in the output of the X industry in the country. In the Y 
industry, the labour input requirement is the same in both countries and normalised to one, so 
1Y Ya b= = . If AXL  workers are employed in the X industry in country A then the output of the 
industry is ( ) 11A AXX L θ−=  and similarly in country B if BXL  workers are employed then the 
output is ( ) 11B BXX L θ−= . Consequently, full employment of labour implies that the production 
possibility frontier for country A is 1A A AY L X
θ−= −  and for country B is 1B B BY L X θ−= − . 
Hence, the production possibility frontiers are convex to the origin as shown in figure one. 
The preferences of the worker/consumers are identical in the two countries and can be 
represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 1A BU U x y
γ γ−= =  where 0 1γ< <  is the 
proportion of income spent on good X. The wage in country A is Aw  and in country B is Bw  
and each worker/consumer is endowed with one unit of labour. Therefore, the Marshallian 
demands of a worker/consumer in country A are A A Xx w pγ=  and ( )1A A Yy w pγ= − , and 
in country B are B B Xx w pγ=  and ( )1B B Yy w pγ= − . Since preferences are identical and 
homothetic, the aggregate demands will be functions of total income so the aggregate demand 
for good X in country A is ( )DA A A XX w L pγ=  and in country B is ( )DA B B XX w L pγ= . These 
demands have the Mill-Graham property, as assumed by Ethier (1982), that a constant 
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fraction of income γ  is spent on good X and 1 γ−  is spent on good Y. The indirect utility 
function of worker/consumers will prove to be useful in the evaluation of welfare and these 
are obtained by substituting the individual demand functions into the utility functions, which 
yields: 
 
1 1
1 1
A A B B
X Y X Y
V w V w
p p p p
γ γ γ γγ γ γ γ− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (1) 
In autarky, each country must supply whatever consumers demand so if it consumes 
both goods then it must produce both goods. If both goods are produced in positive quantities 
then both industries must pay the same wage so the wage in country A is A Y X Aw p p X
θ= =  
and the relative price of X is X Y Ap p X
θ−= . Substituting this relative price and the wage into 
the demand function and solving for the output of the X industry yields: ( ) 11A AX L θγ −=  so the 
autarky equilibrium relative price of X is ( ) ( )1NX Y AAp p L θθγ −−= . Similarly, in country B, the 
autarky relative price of X is ( ) ( )1NX Y BBp p L θθγ −−= , which is higher than in country A as the X 
industry is smaller in country B. If the countries are the same size then the autarky relative 
prices will be equal. Substituting the autarky relative prices into the indirect utility functions 
yields the autarky equilibrium utility of a worker/consumer in country A and country B: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 11 11 1N NA A B BV L V Lγθ γθγ γθ θθ θγ γγ γ γ γ− −− −− −= − = −  (2) 
The utility of a worker/consumer is higher in country A than in country B. The reason 
is that the output of the X industry is inefficiently low in both countries but country A is 
closer to its efficient output. The autarky equlibrium is shown in figure one where it can be 
seen that the output of the X industry is inefficiently low. Given the technology and the 
preferences, the autarky equilibrium in each country is unique and stable as was shown by 
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Ethier (1982). The utility levels under autarky will provide a basis for welfare comparisons 
with utility levels under free trade, free migration, and free migration with free trade. 
 
3. Gains and Losses from Trade 
Ethier (1982) analysed the welfare effects of free trade in this model and 
demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade as suggested by Graham (1923). The 
existence of external economies of scale means that there are multiple equilibria under free 
trade with the possibility of complete specialisation in production. Ethier (1982) analysed the 
possible equilibria under free trade using allocation curves and assuming a Marshallian 
(quantity) adjustment process. Before free trade is established between the two countries, the 
relative price of good X will be lower in country A as it is larger than country B so has more 
labour employed in the X industry and thereby better exploits the economies of scale. 
Therefore, when free trade is established, the X industry in country A will have a cost 
advantage and it will expands its production while the X industry in country B will contract. 
The result will be that country B would specialise in the production of good Y while good X 
would only be produced in country A. In the special case when the two countries are the same 
size ( A BL L= ), the autarky equilibrium would still be an equilibrium as the autarky prices 
would then be same in the two countries. However, this equilibrium would not be stable, as 
an increase in the output of the X industry in one country would give it a cost advantage that 
would lead it to expand while the X industry would contract in the other country. In this case, 
good X could be produced in either country but, without any loss of generality, it will be 
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assumed that it is produced in country A. As in Ethier (1982), there are two possible 
equilibria that will be considered.6 
First, if the share of income spent on good X is sufficiently low then good Y will be 
produced in both countries while good X will only be produced in country A. Since both 
countries produce good Y and its price is the same in both countries under free trade, the 
wage will be the same in both countries, A Bw w= . The price of good Y will be Y Ap w=  and 
the price of good X is X A Ap X w
θ−= . Substituting these prices into the aggregate demand 
function for good X, ( )D DA B A A B B XX X w L w L pγ+ = + , yields the output of the X industry: 
( ) 11TA A BX L L θγ −⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦  and therefore the relative price of good X under free trade is: 
( ) ( ) 1TX Y A Bp p L L θθγ −−⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , which is lower than the autarky equilibrium relative price in 
either country. Therefore, since worker/consumers in both countries receive the same wage 
and face the same prices, they will have the same utility. Substituting the prices and wages 
into the indirect utility functions yields the utility of a worker/consumer under free trade: 
( ) ( )11 11T TA B A BV V L L γθγ θθ γγ γ −− −= = − + , which is higher than autarky utility in either country. 
Hence, both countries gain from trade as shown in figure two (assuming two identical 
countries) where country A produces at PA and consumes at CA while country B produces at 
PB and consumes at CB. This will be an equilibrium if the demand for labour from the X 
industry in country A at the wage A Yw p=  is less than or equal to the total number of workers 
in country A otherwise there will be an excess demand for labour from the X industry as this 
wage. The number of workers employed in the X industry is ( )A BL Lγ +  so this will be an 
equilibrium if ( )A B AL L Lγ + ≤  or if ( )1γ λ λ< + . Since wages in the two countries are 
                                                 
6 When the degree of external economies of scale is low, there may be other equilibria where both 
countries produce good X. It is not possible to derive these equilibria using analytical techniques and they will 
be ignored. 
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equalised there is no incentive for migration in this equilibrium so it is of little interest for the 
later analysis of migration. 
Secondly, if the share of income spent on good X is sufficiently high, ( )1γ λ λ> + , 
then there would be an excess demand for labour from the X industry in country A at the 
wage A Yw p= . Therefore, the wage in country A must be greater than marginal product of 
labour in the Y industry, A Yw p> , so good Y will not be produced in country A as it is 
unprofitable, and country A will completely specialise in the production of good X. Country B 
will completely specialise in the production of good Y and wages will not be equalised in the 
two countries. Since country A produces only good X its output will be: ( ) 11A AX L θ−= , the 
wage in country A will be equal to the marginal product of labour: ( )1A X A X Aw p X p L θθθ −= = , 
and the wage in country B will be B Yw p= . Substituting these values into the aggregate 
demand function and solving yields the free trade equilibrium price: 
 ( ) 11
1
T
X
A B
Y
p L L
p
θγ
γ
−−⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
Since wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, the wage in country B is 
B Yw p=  and the wage in country A is ( )1A X Aw p L θθ−= . Hence, using (3), the wage in country 
A relative to the wage in country B is: 
 1 1
1 1
A B
B A
w L
w L
γ γ
γ γ λ= = >− −  (4) 
The wage in country A will exceed the wage in country B since ( )1γ λ λ> +  in this 
equilibrium with complete specialisation. Note that ( )1A A B Bw L w L γ γ= − . The wage in 
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country A will be higher relative to the wage in country B, the larger is the share of income 
spent on good X and the lower is the relative labour endowment of country A. 
Substituting the free trade equilibrium relative price and the wages into the indirect 
utility functions yields the utility of worker/consumers in the two countries under free trade: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )11 11 1T TA A B B A BV L L V L Lγ θ γθ θγ γγ γ+ −− −− −= = −  (5) 
It is now possible to compare free trade and autarky to ascertain whether there are 
gains or losses from free trade. Dividing the utility of a worker/consumer in country A under 
free trade from (5) by their utility under autarky from (2) yields: 
 ( ) 1
1
1
1
T
A
N
A
V
V
θγ
θ
γγ γγ λ
−
−
−⎡ ⎤= >⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 (6) 
This is greater than unity since from (4) the term in brackets is greater than one and its 
exponent is positive while 1γ <  and its exponent is negative. Therefore, there are always 
gains from trade for country A, where there has been an increase in the output of the industry 
with external economies of scale, which is in keeping with the results of Kemp and Negishi 
(1970) and Helpman (1984). For country B, the production of the good with external 
economies of scale has decreased so there is the possibility of losses from trade. Dividing the 
utility of a worker/consumer in country B under free trade from (5) by their utility under 
autarky from (2) yields: 
 ( ) 11TBN
B
V
V
γθ
θ
γγ λ γγ
−
−−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (7) 
This may be less than or greater than unity since the term in brackets is less than one 
and its exponent is positive while 1γ <  and its exponent is negative. To find the critical value 
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for the degree of external economies of scale that ensures there are gains from trade, take 
logarithms and rearrange: 
 ( )ln 1TB
Gθ θ γ> ≡ − −  (8) 
Where ( )ln ln 1 ln 0G γ γ λ≡ − − − > , which is positive from (4), and since 
ln ln 0γ λ− <  then ( )ln 1 0Gγ− − > >  so therefore 0 1TBθ< < . There will be gains from trade 
for country B if the degree of external economies of scale exceeds the critical value, TBθ θ> . 
The critical value for the degree of external economies of scale depends upon two 
parameters: the demand parameter γ  and the relative labour endowment ratio A BL Lλ = . To 
see how these parameters affect the critical value, differentiate (8) with respect to the two 
parameters, which yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
T
B
ln ln 1 ln 1
0
1 ln 1
1 0
ln 1
T
B γ λ γ γ γθ
γ γ γ γ
θ
λ λ γ
− − − −∂ = >∂ − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
∂ = <∂ −
 (9) 
The larger the relative labour endowment or the smaller the demand parameter then 
the more likely that there will be gains from trade for country B. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: Country A will always gain from free trade and country B will gain 
(lose) from free trade if TBθ θ>  ( TBθ θ< ) where 0TBθ γ∂ ∂ >  and 0TBθ λ∂ ∂ < . 
This result extends propositions nine and ten in Ethier (1982) by deriving the critical 
value for the degree of external economies and showing how it depends upon the parameters 
of the model. The possibility of losses for country B was suggested by Graham (1923), and 
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shown in this setting by Ethier (1982).7 The free trade equilibrium (assuming two identical 
countries) is shown in figure three where there are gains for both countries and figure four 
where country B loses from trade. In both figures, country A produces at PA and consumes at 
CA while country B produces at PB and consumes at CB. It can be seen that if the relative 
price of X under free trade exceeds the relative price under autarky then the smaller country 
will lose from trade. This is more likely the larger is the demand for good X (the larger is γ ) 
and the smaller is the number of workers in country A (the smaller is λ ). 
 
4. Gains and Losses from Migration 
When there is complete specialisation in both countries under free trade, 
( )1γ λ λ> + , the real wage is higher in country A than in country B. Therefore, there is an 
incentive for workers to migrate from the high real wage country to the low real wage 
country. If free migration is allowed then the result will be that workers in country B will 
migrate to country A until the real wage is equalised. Since there is free trade, workers will 
face the same goods prices in the two countries and they will migrate to the country that pays 
the highest wage. Let the number of workers that choose to work in country A be AL  and the 
number in country B be BL , where A B A BL L L L+ = +  so the aggregate demands for good X in 
the two countries are now: ( )DA A A XX w L pγ=  and ( )DB B B XX w L pγ= . Since country A is 
completely specialised in the production of good X, the output of the X industry in country A 
will be 
1
1
A AX L θ−=  and hence the wage in country A will be equal to the marginal product of 
labour: 1A X Aw p L
θθ−= . Country B completely specialises in good Y so its production of good Y 
is B BY L=  and hence the wage in country B is B Yw p= . Since free migration equalises the 
                                                 
7 The possibility of losses was also demonstrated by Panagariya (1981) in a model with increasing 
returns to scale in one industry and decreasing returns to scale in the other industry. 
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wages in the two countries, A Bw w= , therefore the relative price of good X is: 1X Y Ap p L θθ−−= . 
Substituting the relative price and the wages into the demand functions for X and equating 
with the production of X yields the number of workers in each country under free migration: 
( )A A BL L Lγ= +  and ( )( )1B A BL L Lγ= − + . With free migration, a fraction γ  of the workers 
in the world is in country A producing good X and a fraction 1 γ−  is in country B producing 
good Y. Therefore, the equilibrium relative price under free labour migration is: 
 ( ) 1MX A B
Y
p L L
p
θθγ −−⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= +⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  (10) 
To compare the relative price of good X under free trade with that under free labour 
migration divide the free trade price (3) by the autarky price (10) yields: 
 ( )( ) ( )
1
1
1 1 1
1
M T
X X
Y Y
p p
p p
θλγ λ γ λ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ = − + <⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
The term in square brackets is less than one and its exponent is positive while 
( )( )1 1 1γ λ− + <  since ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1γ λ γ λ γ− + = − − − <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and the term in square brackets is 
positive since ( )1λ γ γ< − . Therefore, since labour has migrated from country B to country 
A and country A specialises in the production of good X, the relative price of good X is lower 
under free labour migration than under free trade. 
The welfare effects of the move from free trade to free migration will be analysed by 
looking at the utility of the native workers in country A, the workers remaining in country B, 
and the migrant workers.8 Substituting the price under free migration and the wages into the 
indirect utility function yields the utility of a worker/consumer in each country under free 
migration: 
                                                 
8 The possibility of remittances from the migrant workers in country A to the workers remaining in 
country B is ignored. 
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 ( ) ( )1 111M MA B A BV V L L γθ γθ θγγ γ− −−= = + −  (12) 
Since workers receive the same wage and face the same goods price, they have the 
same utility in both countries. Dividing the utility of a worker/consumer remaining in country 
B under free migration (12) by their utility under free trade (5) yields: 
 ( )
( ) 11 1
1
M
B
T
B
V
V
γθ
θγ λ γγ
γ λ λ
−⎡ ⎤ +⎡ ⎤= >⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (13) 
Both the expressions in square brackets are greater than unity and the exponents are 
positive so the ratio is greater than one. There are undoubtedly gains from free migration for 
worker/consumers remaining in country B due to the positive terms of trade effect. Migrant 
workers from country B obviously gain from migration to country A and there gain is the 
same as for a worker/consumer remaining in country B. 
Dividing the utility of a native worker/consumer in country A under free migration 
(12) by their utility under free trade (5) yields: 
 ( )
( ) 11 1
1
M
A
T
A
V
V
γθ
θγ λ γγ
γ λ λ
−−⎡ ⎤ +⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (14) 
This ratio is ambiguous since although both terms in square brackets are greater than 
unity, the exponent on the first term is negative and on the second term is positive. By taking 
logarithms, it can be shown that the ratio will be greater than one if the degree of external 
economies of scale is greater than the critical value: 
 ( )1MA Gγθ θ −> ≡ ∆  (15) 
where ( )ln ln 1 ln 0G γ γ λ≡ − − − >  from (4), and ( )1 0G Hγ γ∆ = − + >  since 
( )ln ln 1 ln 0H γ λ λ≡ + + − >  from (4). Hence, the critical value for the degree of external 
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economies of scale is ( )0,1MAθ ∈ . This critical value is a function of two parameters and to 
see how it depends upon these two parameters differentiate (15) first with respect to γ : 
 ( ) ]21 0
M
A G H H Gθ γγ
∂ = − + − <⎡⎣∂ ∆  (16) 
The sign of the derivative depends upon the term in square brackets and it seems to be 
ambiguous as ( ) ( )ln 1 ln 1 0H G γ λ− = − + + <  and 0Hγ − > . However, the sign of the 
derivative can be determined by looking at the term in square brackets: 
( )Z G H H Gγ= − + − . When ( )1γ λ λ= + , 0H G= =  and hence 0Z = . Differentiating Z  
with respect to γ  yields: 
 ( ) ( )
21 1 0
1
Z H Gγγ γ γ
∂ − ⎡ ⎤= + − <⎣ ⎦∂ −  (17) 
Therefore, 0Z <  for ( )1 1λ λ γ+ < <  and hence the derivative is negative, 
0MAθ γ∂ ∂ < , as claimed. An increase in the demand parameter reduces the critical value for 
the degree of external economies of scale for which country A will gain from free migration. 
To see how the critical value for the degree of external economies of scale depends on the 
relative labour endowment, differentiate (15) with respect to λ : 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )2
1
ln 1 ln 1 0
1
M
A H
γ γθ λ γ λλ λ λ
−∂ = + − − + >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ + ∆  (18) 
An increase in the relative labour endowment increases the critical value for the 
degree of external economies of scale for which country A will gain from free migration. 
These results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Country B will always gain from free migration and country A will 
gain (lose) from free migration if MAθ θ>  ( MAθ θ< ) where 0MAθ γ∂ ∂ <  and 0MAθ λ∂ ∂ > . 
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Migration of workers from country B to country A expands production of good X in 
country A, contracts the production of good Y in country B. This leads to a fall in the relative 
price of good X that has a positive effect on the terms of trade in country B and a negative 
effect on the terms of trade in country A. Workers that remain in country B undoubtedly gain 
from migration due to the positive terms of trade effect, but native workers in country A may 
lose if the productivity gain due to the external economies of scale does not outweigh the 
negative terms of trade effect. If the degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently 
large then everyone (native workers in country A, workers that remain in country B, and 
migrant workers) will gain from labour migration. Therefore, international migration may 
result in a Pareto improvement! 
Since imports represent a fraction 1 γ−  of total expenditure in country A , an increase 
in the demand parameter, γ , will reduce the negative terms of trade effect for country A and 
decrease the critical value for the degree of external economies of scale, 0MAθ γ∂ ∂ < . With 
migration, the increase in the number of workers in country A is the same as the decrease in 
the number in country B, but the proportionate change in country B will be larger, the smaller 
is country B relative to country A (or the larger is λ ). Thus, the larger will be the terms of 
trade effect due to the contraction of the Y industry in country B relative to the productivity 
gains and the terms of trade effect due to the expansion of the X industry in country A. 
Therefore, for country A, an increase in the relative labour endowment, λ , will increase the 
negative terms of trade effect relative to the productivity gain from migration thereby 
increasing the critical value for the degree of external economies of scale, 0MAθ λ∂ ∂ > . 
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5. Gains from Migration and Trade 
The analysis in this paper so far has examined the welfare effects on the two countries 
of a move from autarky to free trade and then of a move from free trade to free migration 
with free trade. With complete specialisation, ( )1γ λ λ> +  it has been shown that country A 
always gains from a move from autarky to free trade while country B may lose whereas 
country A may lose from a move from free trade to free migration with free trade while 
country B always gains. An obvious question is what are the welfare effects for the two 
countries of a move from autarky to complete economic integration (free migration with free 
trade). The welfare effects for workers in the two countries can be seen by dividing the utility 
of a worker/consumer under free migration with free trade (12) by utility under autarky (2), 
which yields: 
 ( )1 11 1 1 1M MA BN N
A B
V V
V V
γθ
θ γθ
θλ λλ
−
−+⎛ ⎞= > = + >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (19) 
Since the terms in brackets are greater than one and the exponent is positive, then both 
expressions are greater than one. Therefore, both countries gain from a move from autarky to 
complete economic integration (free migration with free trade), but note that the gain is 
greatest for the smaller country B since 1λ > . The gain for the migrant workers from country 
B is the same as the gain for the workers that remain in country B. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 3: Both countries gain from a move from autarky to complete economic 
integration (free labour migration with free trade). 
Hence, everyone (native workers in country A, workers that remain in country B and 
migrant workers) gain from complete economic integration (free migration with free trade). 
Although this equilibrium realises the full benefits of economic integration, it is not Pareto 
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efficient as the production of good X is still lower than that required for Pareto efficiency due 
to the presence of external economies of scale.9 Therefore, both countries would benefit from 
an economic liberalisation that involved the simultaneous introduction of free trade and free 
labour migration. 
However, recent history suggests that economic liberalisation has not involved the 
simultaneous introduction of free trade and free migration of labour. Instead, international 
trade has been liberalised by multilateral negotiations at successive GATT/WTO rounds, and 
it is hoped that the liberalisation of labour migration will follow trade liberalisation. The 
implications of sequential economic liberalisation, where trade liberalisation is followed by 
the liberalisation of labour migration, in this model can be considered by looking at figures 5 
and 6. Respectively, these show the critical values for the degree of external economies of 
scale, MAθ  and TBθ , as functions of the demand parameter, γ , and the relative labour 
endowment, λ , with 3 2λ =  in figure 5 and 4 5γ =  in figure 6. In both figures, free trade 
will increase the welfare of country B if TBθ θ>  and will always increase the welfare of 
country A while free migration will increase the welfare of country A if MAθ θ>  and will 
always increase the welfare of country B. Therefore, there are four regions labelled I to IV 
where in region III, for example, {Gains, Losses} denotes that there are gains for country A 
from free migration and losses for country B from free trade. 
With sequential liberalisation by multilateral negotiations, where each country has a 
veto at each stage, trade liberalisation will occur in regions I and II since both countries will 
gain from free trade but it will not occur in regions III and IV since country B will lose from 
free trade. If the liberalisation of labour migration can only occur after trade liberalisation 
then there will be liberalisation of labour migration in region I since both countries gain from 
                                                 
9 Pareto efficiency would require a subsidy to be given for the production of good X, see proposition 3 
in Panagariya (1981). 
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free migration but not in region II since country A loses from free migration. Hence, only in 
region I will the full benefits of economic integration identified in Proposition 3 be achieved 
and, in the other regions, there are worldwide efficiency gains from further economic 
integration that cannot be achieved by sequential liberalisation.10 This suggests that trade 
liberalisation and the liberalisation of labour migration should be linked together in 
multilateral negotiations. In that case, since both countries gain from complete economic 
integration (free migration with free trade), as shown in Proposition 3, both countries would 
agree to the simultaneous liberalisation of trade and labour migration and the full gains from 
economic integration would be achieved in regions I to IV. 
Finally, in this section, a technical point. To check that the parameter space ( ),γ θ  is 
always divided into four regions for any value of the relative labour endowment, λ , one can 
derive the intersection of the two critical values for the degree of external economies of scale 
M
Aθ  and TBθ . Equating (8) and (15) yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln 1ln ln 1 ln ln 1 ln 1eγ λγ γ λ λ γ λ λ λ++ + = ⇒ + = +  (20) 
As the solution to equations of the form WWe z=  is given by the Lambert W (or 
Omega) function: ( )W z ; see Corless et al (1996) for details of its properties and its many 
applications. Hence, by letting ( )ln 1W γ λ= +  and ( )ln 1z λ λ= +  equation (20) can be 
solved to give the value of the demand parameter at the intersection: 
 
( )
( )
ln 1
ln 1
I W λ λγ λ
+⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= +  (21) 
                                                 
10 It is assumed that there will no liberalisation of labour migration if there has been no trade 
liberalisation, but labour migration could still occur without international trade. Workers in country A would 
gain from migration but workers remaining in country B would lose. Free migration without trade would lead to 
an equilibrium where all the workers were in country A. 
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This is plotted in figure 7 where it can be seen that the intersection always occurs in 
the range of feasible values for the demand parameter, ( )1 ,1Iγ λ λ∈ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Hence, the 
parameter space ( ),γ θ  is always divided into four regions for any value of the relative labour 
endowment, λ . 
 
6. Optimal Migration Policy 
Having considered the gains from free trade and free labour migration one can now 
consider the optimal migration policy for the two countries under free trade. Suppose that 
country A can restrict the number of immigrants or that country B can restrict the number of 
emigrants.11 For country A, there is a trade-off between the gains from the increase in 
productivity due to the external economies of scale and the terms of trade loss. The optimal 
policy restricts the number of immigrants to maximise the utility of a native worker/consumer 
in country A.12 If the number of workers in country A is AL  and in country B is BL  then the 
equilibrium can be obtained simply by replacing AL  and BL  in equations (3), (4) and (5) from 
section three with AL  and BL . Hence, the utility of a native worker in country A is: 
( ) ( )11 1A A BV L Lγ θθ γγ + −− −= . To determine the optimal immigration policy for country A it is 
convenient to use the logarithm of the utility of a native worker in country A, which is: 
 ( )1ln ln ln 1 ln
1A A A B
v V L Lγ θγ γθ
+ −= = + + −−  (22) 
                                                 
11 Freeman (2006) suggests some radical economic policies, such as auctioning immigration visas, that 
would transfer some of the benefits from migration to the native workers and thereby increase the optimal level 
of immigration. 
12 Trefler (1998) considers the optimal immigration policy in a numerical example based upon 
Helpman (1984) where the degree of external economies is one-half. 
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Migration from country B to country A involves an increase in the labour force in 
country A and a corresponding decrease in the labour force in country B so 1B AdL dL = − . 
Differentiating (22) yields the welfare effect of immigration for country A: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1 1
1
B AA A A A A A
A A B B A B A B
L Ldv v v dL v v
dL L L dL L L L L
γ θ γ θ
θ
+ − − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + = − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −  (23) 
Before deriving the interior solution, consider the two possible corner solutions where 
no immigration is optimal or where unrestricted immigration is optimal. No immigration is 
optimal if the derivative is negative when the labour force in the two countries is equal to the 
initial labour endowments so A B A BL L L L λ= = . Then, the derivative (23) is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 0
1
A
A A
dv
dL L
γ θ γ θ λθ= + − − − − <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦−  (24) 
This will be negative if the relative labour endowment is sufficiently large or if the 
degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently small. Solving for the critical value for 
the degree of external economies of scale yields: 
 ( )( )( )0
1 1
1
1 1A
γ λθ θ γγ λ
− +< ≡ > −+ −  (25) 
Therefore, no immigration is optimal for country A if the degree of external 
economies of scale 0Aθ θ< . Then, the terms of trade loss dominates any productivity gain due 
to external economies of scale. It can be shown that 0 0Aθ γ∂ ∂ <  as an increase in the demand 
parameter decreases the size of the negative terms of trade effect, and that 0 0Aθ λ∂ ∂ >  as an 
increase in the relative labour endowment increases the size of the negative terms of trade 
effect. 
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At the other extreme, unrestricted immigration will be optimal if the derivative is 
positive when wages are equalised in the two countries and this will happen when 
( )1A BL L γ γ= − . Then, the derivative is: 
 ( ) ( )
1 1 1 0
1
A
A A
dv
dL L
γ θθ= + − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦−  (26) 
This will be positive if the degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently large. 
Solving for the critical value yields: 
 1 1
1 2
U
Aθ θ γ≥ ≡ >+  (27) 
Therefore, unrestricted immigration is optimal for country A if the degree of external 
economies of scale UAθ θ> . Then, the productivity gain due to external economies of scale 
dominates the terms of trade loss. It is obvious that 0UAθ γ∂ ∂ <  as an increase in the demand 
parameter increases the size of the negative terms of trade effect, and that 0UAθ λ∂ ∂ =  as the 
relative labour endowment does not affect the welfare effect of immigration when 
unrestricted immigration has equalised wages. 
For the interior solution, the optimal immigration policy is obtained by setting the 
derivative (23) equal to zero and involves allowing immigration until the labour force in 
country A relative to the labour force in country B is: 
 ( )( )
1
1 1
A
B
L
L
γ θ
γ θ
+ −= − −  (28) 
Since the denominator is clearly positive, the numerator has to be positive so 
1 0γ θ+ − >  or 1θ γ> −  for any sensible interior solution. For any immigration to actually 
occur, A BL L λ> , which implies that 0Aθ θ> . The corresponding relative wage is: 
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 ( )1 1
1
A
B
w
w
γ θ
γ θ
−= >+ −  (29) 
If immigration is restricted then this must be greater than one, which will be the case 
if UAθ θ< . Therefore, there will be an interior solution if 0 UA Aθ θ θ< < . The second-order 
conditions for a welfare maximum are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 0
1
A A A B A A B A A A
A A B A A A B B A A B A B
B A
A B
d v v v dL v v dL v v v
dL L L L dL L L L dL L L L L
L L
L L
γ θ γ θθ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − − = − +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
− ⎡ ⎤= + − + − − <⎣ ⎦−
 (30) 
Since 1 0γ θ+ − >  in any sensible interior solution, then the second order conditions 
are clearly satisfied. These results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: The optimal immigration policy for country A is unrestricted 
immigration if UAθ θ>  and no immigration if 0Aθ θ< . Otherwise, the optimal immigration 
policy is to allow immigration until the relative wage ( ) ( )1 1A Bw w γ θ γ θ= − + − . 
Clearly, the optimal immigration policy depends upon the size of the positive 
productivity effect relative to the negative terms of trade effect. The critical values are shown 
in figure 8 as a function of the demand parameter and in figure 9 as a function of the relative 
labour endowment. Perhaps the most striking feature of the figures is the fairly narrow range 
of parameter values where there is an interior solution. In contrast to the numerical example 
in Trefler (1998), the optimal immigration policy might involve unrestricted immigration if 
the degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently high.13 Figure 10 shows the relative 
wage as a function of the degree of external economies of scale. 
                                                 
13 Since Trefler (1998) uses a value for the degree of external economies of scale equal to one-half, the 
possibility of unrestricted immigration is precluded by this restrictive assumption. 
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Similarly, for country B, it may restrict emigration to maximise the utility of workers 
that remain in country B. The utility of a worker that remains in country B is 
( ) 11B A BV L Lγθ γγ − −= −  and the logarithm of utility is: 
 ( )ln ln 1 ln ln
1B B A B
v V L Lγγ γθ= = − + −−  (31) 
Migration involves an increase in the labour force in country A and a decrease in the 
labour force in country B. Therefore, the effect of emigration from country B to country A is: 
 ( ) ( )1 01B B B B B B B AA A B A A B A B
dv v v dL v v L L
dL L L dL L L L L
γ θθ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + = − = + − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −  (32) 
This is unambiguously positive due to the positive terms of trade effect and this leads 
to the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Emigration always increases the utility of a worker/consumer in 
country B hence unrestricted emigration is the optimal policy for country B. 
The only effect of emigration on workers that remain in country B is the positive 
terms of trade effect that comes from the expansion of the X industry in country A and the 
contraction of the Y industry in country B. Therefore, country B would not want to restrict 
emigration. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Using the Ethier (1982) model, this paper has analysed the welfare effects of free 
trade, free labour migration and economic integration (free labour migration with free trade). 
Critical values for the degree of external economies have been derived as functions of the 
demand parameter and the relative labour endowment. When the larger country completely 
specialises in the production of the good with external economies of scale under free trade, it 
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was shown that the larger country gains from free trade and that the smaller country will only 
gain if the degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently high. Starting from free trade, 
it was shown that the larger country would only gain from free migration if the degree of 
external economies is sufficiently high and that the smaller country will always gain. If the 
larger country gains from free migration then free migration will be a Pareto-improving 
policy since both countries and the migrant workers gain. Since the smaller country may lose 
from free trade and the larger country may lose from free migration, multilateral negotiations 
about sequential liberalisation (free trade followed by free migration) will not always bring 
about complete economic integration (free trade and free migration) even though this would 
benefit both countries. This inefficient outcome could be avoided by the linkage of trade 
liberalisation and the liberalisation of labour migration in multilateral negotiations. 
The optimal immigration policy for the larger country was derived and it was shown 
that it involves a trade off of the positive productivity gains due to the external economies of 
scale with the negative terms of trade effect due to the expansion of the export industry in the 
larger country and the contraction of the export industry in the smaller country. When the 
degree of external economies of scale is sufficiently low then the optimal policy is no 
immigration and when it is sufficiently high then the optimal policy is unrestricted 
immigration. For intermediate values of the degree of external economies of scale, the 
optimal policy is restricted immigration. The smaller country always benefits from 
emigration since it results in a positive terms of trade effect as it imports the good produced 
by the larger country. 
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Figure 9: Optimal Immigration Policy and the Relative Labour Endowment
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Figure 10: Economies of Scale and Relative Wages with the Optimal Immigration Policy
9
1,
10
	 
 

Restricted Immigration
1
